Introduction
11
a variety of dispositions and attitudes. These can be classified into two broad
categories:
cognitive elements
(argumentation, inference making, and reflec-
tive judgment) and
propensity elements
(dispositions, abilities, and attitudes)
(Halonen 1995). Note, however, the phenomenon of
action
is not mentioned in
the Delphi definition. It is, in principle possible to meet the stipulated require-
ments of the definition and not
do
anything.
Strong skills in argumentation are not to be dismissed. They help to provide
a sound basis for capable decision making. This is because decision making
is based on judgments derived from argumentation. Such decision making
involves understanding and interpreting the propositions and arguments of
others, and being able to make objections and provide rebuttals to objections.
Broadly speaking, then, this sense of the term “critical thinking” is seen as
involving skills in
argumentation.
Critical thinking in this sense is a funda-
mental skill and is one which—on the available evidence—universities have
apparently not been teaching as well as they should.
Critical thinking as reflective thinking
(the “skills-and-judgments” view)
However, even within the cognitive-philosophical camp, critical thinking is
often defined more widely than this, and in practical and instrumental terms,
for example, as: “reflective and reasonable thinking that is focused on deciding
what to believe or do” (Ennis 1985) or as “thinking aimed at forming a judg-
ment” (Bailin, Case, Coombs and Daniels 1999, 287) or as “skillful, responsible
thinking that facilitates good judgment” (Lipman 1988, 39). This definition
focuses less on the mechanics of the skill of argumentation and more on the
reflective
basis for decision making and judgment calls. We might call this the
“skills-and-judgments” view.
These wider senses of critical thinking are not inconsistent with “critical
thinking as argumentation,” and are, indeed, in some sense premised on it.
Being able to demonstrate “reflective thinking” for the purposes of decision
making requires skills in argumentation. However, this account does bring in
a different emphasis, focusing less on mechanisms of argumentation qua infer-
ence making, and more on judgment formation, which is at a higher cognitive
level. (The relationship seems asymmetric: one can engage in idle argumenta-
tion without making a judgment toward a decision, but not vice-versa—or at
least not
ideally
.)
The definition by Ennis, given above—“reflective and reasonable thinking
that is focused on deciding what to believe or do”—is recognized as the lead-
ing definition in the “skills-and-judgments” view. However, note that Ennis’s
definition is somewhat limiting by again not necessitating, for its application,
any commitment to
action
on the part of the critical thinker. On this account,
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